At the level of the European Union (EU) policies to support real convergence across member states are limited to pubfic expenditure, whereas the revenue side of the EU budget is largely neglected. After discussing convergence as a policy goal, this article identifies the most important shortcomings of the EU's current fiscal system with respect to the reduction of spatial disparities. Alternatives to the current European revenue system are then examined with a view to their appropriateness for realizing inter-nation progressivity.
O n January 1 st, 1999, 11 out of 15 EU member states joined up to form the European Monetary Union (EMU). The European Union can now be regarded as a federation at an early stage. In the realm of public finance the concept of fiscal federalism is of special importance for the formulation of economic policy recommendations within federations. Two basic questions are at the center of this concept: to which level of a federation should public tasksallocative and distributive functions as well as macroeconomic stabilization and structural policybe assigned? And how are the necessary expenditures, and accordingly public revenues, distributed to the federation's levels? 1 For a long time the scope of the theory of fiscal federalism was confined exclusively to national federations (examples are Germany or the United States). However, with the formation of federations by several independent nation states rendering part of their sovereignty to a central institution, the international dimension is increasingly gaining in importance. The most prominent case of a developing "international federation" certainly is the EU, but other nation states have also been building such federations during recent years, e.g. the Russian Federation. As a reaction to the advancing European integration a remarkable body of research work and publications on the theoretical and empirical relevance of insights gained from the perspective of fiscal federalism for the EU has been established in the last decade.
One basic dispute in traditional fiscal federalism literature is that between "centralists" and "decen-* University of Giessen, Germany.
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tralists" on the degree to which national sovereignty should be given up by ceding competencies to the central institution. 2 The other argument is about the normative concept underlying fiscal relations: should the distributive goal (to level out inter-nation differences in living conditions by some cooperative interaction between the different levels and member states) or the allocative goal (to allow system competition among the members of the federation and to rely on the subsidiarity principle) be pursued as the dominating one? 3
To the present, the relations between the member states and the EU itself as the central institution have been determined to a large extent by the subsidiarity principle and allocative goals, in the sense that fulfilling these tasks at lower levels is generally preferable? Although one well-known and generally undisputed result from the theory of fiscal federalism is that the redistributive function is to be assigned to the federation's central level, and although problems of divergence between EU regions and whole countries still exist and will be exacerbated by the 
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of the EU's budget system. The comparatively small volume of the budget of the EU itself (1.27 percent of the member countries' total GDP per year from 2000 to 2006) is the quantitative reflection of the current preferences in European economic policy.
Rather new and by far not fully developed is the debate as to whether and how the structure of revenues of the central institution can contribute to the policy goals within an international federation. In the case of the EU the main aspect under discussion for several years now has been whether member states are "net contributors" to the European budget or whether their payments are disproportionately high compared to their returns; a dispute aroused by Germany, Austria and the Netherlands in particular? Leaving this purely fiscal argument aside, only few authors have recently tried to examine systematically the economic and especially the distributive consequences of national contributions to the EU budget?
Up to now, aspects of redistribution within the EU have been mostly addressed by theorists from the perspective of interpersonal redistribution. In political practice the reduction of interregional and international disparities has been more important. European social, structural and cohesion funds are mainly designed as financial support for the development of poorer EU regions or countries. Recently, however, the economic profession seems to have become more sensitive towards this issue, as a realistic perspective for membership of even "poorer" countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE countries) is shaping.
This article deals with the problem of inter-nation divergence within the EU-15, but also with regard to the CEE candidates for membership, and the ability of the European fiscal system to support convergence of (potential) EU members. The main emphasis will be placed on revenue provisions rather than on the expenditure side of the EU budget. The most important shortcomings of the EU's current revenue system from the perspective of inter-nation distribution are identified and several alternatives are 244 discussed to find out whether they are more appropriate to overcome the prevailing income disparities.
Measuring Inter-Nation Divergence
A variety of indicators for convergence among a group of countries is presented in the literature; for the EU indicators for real and monetary convergence are usually distinguished. The following considerations concentrate on indicators concerning real convergence. According to a very general definition by Andreff convergence means "reducing disparities in levels of living within the EU."' For specification Prud'homme 8 suggests several economic indicators, e.g. output or consumption per capita and unemployment rates, and points out differences in per capita incomes as the most important indicator for spatial disparities. This variable also underlies the concept of B-convergence used in endogenous growth theory, which defines convergence as a catching-up process in which poorer countries exhibit larger growth rates of per capita incomes than the richer ones2 In this view the process of convergence is a transitory process at the end of which there should be cohesion, as it is called in the European context.
For obtaining a valid picture of the actual average income situation of individuals within a country (or a region) the use of per capita incomes at purchasing power parities (PPP) is preferable to nominal per capita incomes at current market prices. To determine the relative income position of an average inhabitant of an individual country, its per capita income at PPP is compared to the average per capita income across all countries considered. For simplicity, countries with a relative income position below one hundred percent, i.e. with a per capita income below average, are subsequently addressed as "poor", whereas countries above average are called "rich". We can further use a simple, but easily tractable measure of dispersion dr,i, relating for a group of countries i at time t the relative income position of the richest to that of the poorest country.
